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THE BRIGHT SIDE OF MEMORY ERRORS 
 
By Katherine Puddifoot and Lisa Bortolotti 
 
 
On several occasions in 2001, following the attacks the World Trade Centre on 9/11, 
US President George Bush said he remembered watching on TV the first plane 
crashing into the Towers. However, at the time there was no footage of the first plane 
crash, so his recollection could not be accurate. He was told about the crash, but did 
not watch it on TV. More recently, in 2015, presidential candidate Donald Trump said 
he remembered witnessing large crowds of Muslims celebrating the 9/11 attacks in 
New Jersey. There is no evidence that such a celebration occurred, although there was 
a rumour at the time that some Muslims had cheered at the news of the terrorist 
attack. This rumour was never confirmed, and later proved false.  
 
It is natural to interpret memory errors like these—where a person misremembers the 
details of a past event—as showing that the person who makes the error is poor at 
remembering things, or at least poorer at remembering things than other people. If the 
person is a new mother, you might conclude that they have “baby brain”. If the person 
is over a certain age, you might conclude that their memory is declining. In any case, 
you are likely to take evidence of the memory error to provide reason for reducing the 
trust that you place in the person who makes the error, perhaps looking for other, 
more trustworthy people to depend upon for information.  
 
This could be a serious mistake. If Bush misremembers details of how he learnt about 
the first plane crashing into the World Trade Centre, you have reason not to trust his 
description of that event. If Trump misremembers seeing large crowds of Muslims 
cheering, you should not take his word about the reaction Muslims had after the 
attacks. But it can be a mistake to infer from evidence that people have made a 
memory error that they are less reliable at remembering things than other people or 
their younger selves, or that they are generally an unreliable source of information.  
 
These points become clearer when we consider the recent discussion of memory 
errors in cognitive science. It is now widely recognised that memory errors are often 
the result of the ordinary ways that the human brain operates. It is generally accepted 
that memories are reconstructed. Memory systems do not act like storehouses, 
retaining complete records of events in the past in discrete files. Instead, they store 
traces of information about events. These traces of information are recombined at the 
point when a person remembers an event, constructing a memory of the event. 
Because memory systems construct representations of the past from traces, and there 
are gaps to be filled, they are prone to error: for instance, traces of information from 
different events can be combined in ways that inaccurately reflect the past.   
 
We all have reconstructive memory systems. Consequently, we are all highly 
susceptible to making the types of memory errors that result from the process of 
reconstruction. When we make these errors, we should not be assumed to be less 
reliable than other people at remembering the past because other people are also 
susceptible to making these errors. We should not be assumed to be less reliable than 
our former, younger selves, because they too were susceptible to making the same 
errors. If other people judge us in these ways, then they are being overly harsh.  
 
 
REASON FOR PESSIMISM? 
 
We might get quite pessimistic at this point. The picture of human memory sketched 
by the cognitive sciences might be interpreted as indicating that we should not trust 
anyone because we are all susceptible to making memory errors. In fact, there are 
good reasons to resist this pessimism.  First, it is consistent with memory systems 
being reconstructive that they very frequently, even most of the time, produce true 
memories of the past. In order to navigate our physical and social environments, we 
need to be able to learn from past experiences. The fact that we make our way around 
our physical and social worlds largely successfully suggest that our memory systems 
often construct memories of the past that are reliable. Reconstructive memory systems 
are clearly not infallible because they produce errors, but this does not mean that they 
are not highly reliable, producing accurate memories under many circumstances.   
 
Second, some of our memory errors can increase our overall fitness and even boost 
our psychological wellbeing. For instance, memories of the past that are biased and 
self-enhancing lead us to remember our past selves better than we really were at the 
time (e.g. smarter). This allows us to form an unrealistically positive view of 
ourselves which may support our motivation to continue pursuing our goals after 
setbacks rather than give up, and thus improves our resilience in critical situations and 
our chances of success in fulfilling our goals. 
 
Third, and perhaps most surprisingly, the very features of the human brain that make 
us prone to memory errors can also put us in a good position to gain knowledge about 
the world by making us good at gathering and processing information. To illustrate 
this point, let us focus in on two commonly discussed memory errors.  
 
 
ADVANTAGES OF RECONSTRUCTIVE MEMORY  
 
One error that has been the focus of intense debate in psychology and legal theory, in 
large part due to the work of University of California, Irvine psychologist Elizabeth 
Loftus, is the post-event misinformation effect. When this effect occurs, memories are 
updated to reflect false information that is received after an event. The effect has been 
widely discussed within the legal and forensic context as it is argued that claimants 
and eyewitnesses are susceptible to being influenced by false information, for 
example through suggestive police questioning, and consequently provide false 
testimony. Clearly, the misinformation effect can be deeply problematic, leading us to 
have and report false beliefs about events that we experienced. In a criminal context, 
this can involve people being falsely accused or acquitted of serious crimes.  
 
However, it is important to notice that recent explanations of the misinformation 
effect suggest that the mechanisms leading to the effect can, under some 
circumstances, increase the chance of gathering and storing accurate information. 
Neuroscientists tell us that, when the memory of an event is recalled, the information 
stored in the memory is reactivated, and there is a period during which new 
information about that event can be incorporated into the memory—this process has 
been labelled reconsolidation.  
 
In a bad case, the new information about the event that is incorporated into the 
memory is false, leading to the misinformation effect. It is likely that something 
similar happened to the recollections of 9/11 reported by Bush and Trump. Bush 
might have heard reports about the first plane crashing and incorporated that story 
into his own experience of 9/11 (“I saw the crash”). Similarly, Trump might have 
heard the rumour about crowds of Muslims celebrating and incorporated that story in 
his own recollection of how people reacted on the day (“I saw crowds cheering”). In 
the such examples, the information added to the memory is inaccurate.  
 
However, in good cases, reconsolidation allows existing memories to be updated to 
reflect the most recent information that we have about an event, and that information 
is accurate. Imagine, for example, that you have met your new colleague James while 
walking through your workplace. You decide to make eye contact, smile and say 
hello. However, James ignores your efforts, avoids eye contact, and walks on by. You 
form the impression that James is rude. You think to yourself that he is not going to 
be a good colleague. You later meet another colleague and friend, Rita. She tells you 
that James has just received some bad news about a family member. At this point, 
your memory of the original event (meeting James and being ignored by him) is 
reactivated and the new information (James had just received bad news) is 
incorporated. You no longer remember that James behaved in a rude way, but 
remember instead that he looked distracted and upset. The information that is stored 
and ready for retrieval at the end of this process does not accurately reflect your 
experience of the initial event but it does reflect the most up to date information 
available to you. You are able to update your impression of your new colleague so 
that it is not inappropriately negative about his personal characteristics. What this 
example illustrates is that the brain mechanisms that produce the misinformation 
effect also enable us to form beliefs that reflect up to date information.  
 
There is another common memory error, known as the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
(DRM) illusion because it was initially studied by James Deese in the 1950s and then 
again by Henry L. Roediger III and Kathleen McDermott in the 1990s. Deese, and 
Roediger and McDermott conducted experiments in which participants were 
presented with a list of words that had a related meaning (e.g. baker, butter, filling, 
brown, dough, grain, flour, knife, wheat, old) and then asked to recall the items on the 
list. Participants systematically claimed to have studied items that were not on the list 
but were related in meaning to those that were. In a related experiment by Brewer and 
colleagues in 1981, participants spent some time in an office context and then asked 
what they saw in the office. They claimed to have seen items that were not present but 
are commonly found in offices. Inside and outside of experimental settings we can 
believe that we encountered items that we did not, and therefore have false memories.  
 
Mistakenly thinking that you encountered items that you did not can prevent you from 
having knowledge about your environment. But there are two explanations of the 
DRM illusion, both of which suggest that the features of the human brain that 
sometimes lead us to mistakenly think that we encountered items can also lead us to 
gain knowledge.  
 
The first explanation is that the encounters with items that are closely related to each 
other trigger the concepts of related items. Thoughts about bakers, butter, and fillings, 
for example, trigger the thought of bread. Then, mistakenly, we remember the concept 
being triggered but misidentify the memory, thinking that it is a memory of 
encountering the item.  
 
On this explanation, the DRM illusion is due to the way that the mind comes to 
associate items with each other. It is also due to the way that exposure to some items 
triggers thoughts about related items. These tendencies can help us to gain 
knowledge. If items are associated with each other because they have been 
encountered in the same place and time, e.g. they have all been encountered in an 
office, then they are likely to be encountered together again. Associating the items 
with each other allows us to predict what we are likely to find in our environment. If 
we are in a new workplace, for example, we associated the items that we encounter 
with other items that we are likely to encounter, because they are frequently found in 
offices. This will enable us to predict what we are likely to find in the novel 
environment. Making such associations can allow us to predict features of our 
environment.  
 
The second explanation of the DRM illusion proposed within cognitive science is that 
the information about the items that are encountered is represented in two different 
ways in the mind. The mind records each of the items (e.g. each office item) and 
separately records the common theme linking all the items (office items). The 
memory of the common theme outlasts the memory of the specific details. If we try to 
recall the specific items after the memory with the details has faded we depend upon 
our memory of the common theme. For instance, the memory that there were office 
items can be used to determine which specific items we encountered. Errors occur 
when our memory systems fill out details about the items that we have encountered in 
a way that fits with the memory of the common theme of the items (e.g. with office 
items) but includes items that were not present. 
 
On this explanation of the DRM illusion, the formation of memories that reflect a 
common theme among the items we encountered and the dependence upon that 
memory are the source of the memory error. Once again, this feature of human 
memory systems can help us to gain knowledge. Human memory only has limited 
storage capacity, so it is not efficient for it to store details about each of the items 
encountered in an environment, which is why the details fade. But the common theme 
of the items can be contained in a compact record; it does not require much storage 
capacity and therefore lasts longer. Once details fade, the compact, abstract memory 
of the common theme provides an important source of information: it is possible to 
make an inference from the common theme we remember to the specific details that 
we experienced. For instance, it is possible to infer from the memory of being 
surrounded by office items that we were near a desk. The memory of the common 
theme can also support further abstract thinking, inference and convergent thinking.  
 
Take the example of Antonia. She has been given a shopping list by her partner, but 
she misplaces the list after briefly looking at it. She does not recall the specific items 
on the list but has formed a memory of the common theme of the items on the list: 
they were ingredients for a cake. Based on her memory of this common theme, she 
buys eggs and flour. She buys eggs because they are cake ingredients, not because 
‘eggs’ was on the list. ‘Eggs’ was not on the list, because she already has eggs at 
home. However, Antonia’s formation of the memory of the common theme (cake 
ingredients) and her dependence on that memory allows her to buy flour, which was 
one of the items on the list and is one of the ingredients she needs. Using the memory 
of the common theme, Antonia can also engage in further reasoning: she can conclude 
that her partner is planning to bake a cake, that she is going to have something tasty 
after tea, that she does not have to buy dessert, and so on.  
 
So the features of the human brain that lead it to produce some of the most commonly 
discussed memory errors also enable us to gain knowledge. Memories of past events 
can be updated with new information. Information that might otherwise be lost can be 
retained. Predictions can be made about items that are likely to be found in an 
environment. We can engage in abstract reasoning. Each of these outcomes can be 
both the result of the features of the human brain that cause common memory errors 
and sources of knowledge.  
 
Now let us consider our opening examples of memory errors. It might be natural to 
think that Bush’s and Trump’s memory of what happened in 9/11 is unreliable, that 
they should not be trusted, and that other people are more reliable sources of 
information. But in fact they could be a good source of information on other matters 
because it is likely that the errors they made are due to the ordinary ways that all 
human brains work. Other people could have made similar errors, and indeed there is 
a vast literature on flashbulb memories and false testimonies concerning events such 
as 9/11.  
 
Some of our memory errors are likely to be the product of a feature of the human 
brain that enables us to gain information, through updating our existing memories, 
retaining information that might be lost, and engaging in abstract reasoning. Rather 
than being a sign that we are less reliable than we used to be, or less reliable than 
other people, our memory errors can simply be due to the ordinary operation of 
features of the mind that allow us to navigate the world.   
 
  
